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1 IntroductionThe formal study of inference has undergone an explosion over the past 15 years with theintroduction of nonmonotonic (default) reasoning. Here we consider some ramications ofdefault reasoning that may be applicable to expertise. It is now well recognized that a greatdeal of practical knowledge about any domain is in the form of defaults. This suggests thepossibility of characterizing expertise in terms of defaults and default use. We will do thistoward the end of the paper after developing some prerequisite machinery. One ingredientin our characterization is the capacity to deny defaults; this has received little attention inthe literature and seems to require some new technical devices.1.1 Default reasoningThe commonsense world is far too complex for reasoners, human or otherwise, to be awareof all information that may be salient to a situation at any given time. Therefore very oftena conclusion one draws is not necessarily true; additional information might have \defeated"the conclusion and even prevented the inference in the rst place. When I learn that Tweetyis a bird, it is reasonable for me to conclude that Tweety can y, since birds typically y;but the conclusion may be false nevertheless. An endless supply of counterexamples can beconstructed: Tweety may have had her wings clipped or may have become a victim of anoil-spill or may be a penguin; all good reasons for her not to be a yer. Moreover, had Iknown the additional information that Tweety was a penguin, I would not have concludedthat she can y in the rst place. Very many cases of practical reasoning are of this sort. Yetthis form of reasoning lies outside the framework of traditional \monotonic" logic in whichmore information leads to more (not fewer) conclusions [10].Researchers have addressed this issue by developing formalisms for default (or nonmono-tonic) reasoning, in which something inferred from one set of information may fail to beinferred from that set augmented with additional information. Three well-known such for-malisms are Reiter's default logic (DL) [12], McDermott and Doyle's non-monotonic logic(NML) [8], and McCarthy's circumscription [7]. Each of these oers a formal treatment of areasoner coming to a reasonable yet defeasible conclusion, based on whatever knowledge is3
available plus some default rule(s). Just what is a reasonable conclusion, how it is reached,and what the default rules are, vary from formalism to formalism.In looking more closely at the Tweety example, we can see two elements at work. Therst is a default principle (which we will usually refer to simply as a default) about typicalfeatures of birds, such as \birds typically y", and the second is a means to employ thatknowledge to draw a conclusion about particular birds (e.g., Tweety). Most of the researchin default reasoning has dealt with both of these issues in varying ways. It is our contentionin this paper that for some purposes, such as representing novice-expert dierences, it isimportant to sharply separate these two aspects. As a matter of notation we will writeBird(x) typ! Fly(x) for the default \birds typically y"; more generally we write 	 typ! for \	's typically are 's". This notation is intended to be neutral among all the standarddefault formalisms: in DL, typ! would be expressed as an inference rule, in NML it wouldinvolve a consistency predicate, and in circumscription it would involve an abnormalitypredicate.1.2 ExpertiseCognitive scientists have intensively studied expertise, in many settings. Not surprisingly itis novice-expert dierences that motivate many of these studies. Mayer [6] describes severalknowledge-based distinctions between experts and novices including: (i) novices tend to storetheir knowledge in small fragmented units, while experts store theirs in larger interconnectedfunctional units and (ii) experts tend to know and use deep structural knowledge whilenovices use more supercial knowledge.Experts have substantial knowledge about their domain of expertise, yet their judge-ments are based on surprisingly little information (see [2] and [3]).1 For instance in medicaldiagnoses, experts form a few, well-focused hypotheses early in the process (even before ad-equate data is presented), and use that to guide what data they seek [5]. In contrast novices1While one might suppose that the expert knows which relevant pieces of information to pick out andwhich pieces to ignore, there is some evidence indicating that this is not the case. To the contrary, it hasbeen shown that experts are often inuenced by irrelevant information and as a result their decisions mayturn out to be incorrect or unreliable [13]. Moreover, experts are often unable to provide convincing accountsof how they make their judgments (see [1]). 4
follow more of a broad searching strategy, don't have well-formulated hypotheses early on,and obtain much more information (much of which is not of value).Feltovich et al [4] suggest several postulates regarding dierent characteristics of noviceand expert knowledge bases (in the domain of medicine). Included is that the novice's knowl-edge base is sparse|it lacks the cross referencing and clustering structure of the expert'sdense knowledge base. Also, the novice's knowledge is more imprecise than the expert's.This is, in part, due to the expert's \ne-tuning" of her knowledge through clinical experi-ence. These dierences result in novice expectations (in the eld of medical diagnosis) being\either overly general, allowing clinical ndings that should not occur, or overly specic notallowing the legitimate range". Rau [11] provides a computational treatment of breadthand salience of knowledge which appears related to the appropriate range of application ofknowledge in making judgments.Both experts and novices draw conclusions based on their knowledge. They may dierin their knowledge; e.g., an ornithologist will likely believe the default that cardinals areeither red (males) or russet (females)|with rare exceptions being white (albinos)|while acasual observer (i.e., a novice) may mistakenly believe simply that cardinals are typicallyred, a narrower range of possibilities than that used by the expert.2 They may also dierin how they draw conclusions from their knowledge. This knowledge/conclusion-drawingdistinction can be misleading, though. How one draws conclusions can depend on one'sknowledge, i.e., the inference procedures can be partly encoded as declarative knowledge,such as in typicality statements; this will become important as our discussion proceeds.1.3 An exampleImagine Tommy to be a (novice) robot and Sue an (expert) ornithologist responsible fortraining Tommy. Sue takes Tommy to the zoo and the following conversation ensues:Tommy: \Look, someone's feeding all those birds!"Sue: \Do you know what kind of birds they are?"Tommy: \No."Sue: \They're cardinals."2We conjecture that such \default ranges"|which will be addressed in what follows|are importantaspects of the phenomenon studied in [4] and [11]. 5
Tommy: \But they're not red. I thought cardinals were supposed to be bright red."Sue: \I used to think that also. Quite a few are red but many others are russet like these."Tommy: \Are all cardinals red or russet?"Sue: \Almost; a very few are white albinos. I wonder why only russet ones are here."Sue (to the zookeeper): \Why are there only female cardinals here?"3Zookeeper: \We put the males in another cage for an experiment."From the dialog we can presume that in the past Tommy has picked up a bad default: that car-dinals typically are red. Sue, the expert, teaches him otherwise. This requires that her language|aswell as Tommy's|allow for the expression of the denial of defaults (e.g., roughly, \it is not the casethat cardinals typically are red"). There are a number of other features illustrated in the abovedialog which we will point out in sections 3 and 4. First, in Section 2 we deal with the denial ofdefaults.2 Range defaults and default denials2.1 Range defaultsIn the above dialog there is evidence that Sue holds a special kind of default called a range defaultabout cardinal color. Specically, Sue believes that cardinals typically are red or russet, thoughthere are exceptions|the albinos|and she denies that cardinals typically are red. Moreover shewould also deny that cardinals typically are russet: there are proportionately too many red andtoo many russet cardinals for these latter defaults to be sensible. Here's another example: Peopletypically are male or female4|yet there are too many male and too many female people to excludeeither maleness or femaleness as typical. Both of the defaults \people typically are male" and\people typically are female" are too restrictive and hence inappropriate.More formally, a range default is an accepted default of the form \P's are typically Q's" whereQ is a disjunction (i.e., Wi2I i) and for every shorter disjunction S formed from the (disjunctive)components of Q, the (sub-) default \P's are typically S's" is denied. Thus a range default hastwo parts: an armed disjunctive default (e.g., \cardinals typically are red or russet") and various3Sue, but not Tommy, knows that female cardinals are russet and males are red.4Note that this too is a default, not a universal fact. There are rare hermaphroditic or neuter persons whoare neither (singularly) male nor (singularly) female; and perhaps gender-changes can be similarly construed.6
denied defaults (e.g., \it is not the case that cardinals typically are red" and \it is not the case thatcardinals typically are russet"). (This will be further formalized in Section 2.2.) The above examplesabove suggest that some of the detailed, ne-tuned, substantial quantity of expert knowledge takesthe form of range defaults as opposed to simple defaults.5Why bother with range defaults, or more precisely, with default denials at all? Knowing thata particular bird is a cardinal and that typically cardinals are red or russet, the latter being thearmative disjunctive part of a range default, should lead one to conclude that the bird is red orrusset, unless she knows to the contrary. A reasoner need not go on to deny the individual defaults\typically cardinals are red" and \typically cardinals are russet" in reaching that conclusion. Whydo range defaults deserve special mention? There are two reasons: (i) their representation presentsa challenge (see [9]) and (ii) they can play a role in reasoning that is not accomplished solelywith \ordinary" defaults. For one there are cases in commonsense reasoning where it is not onlyimportant to reach the correct default conclusion, but also to have meta-knowledge about one'sown defaults which itself can be reasoned with and about.For instance in the above dialog Sue notices that the collection of birds in the zoo is unusual:they are all russet and hence female. But the plain disjunctive default, namely that cardinalstypically are red or russet, does not prompt this conclusion. She does have excellent reason tothink it is an oddity, though, because she has the additional information that it is not the case thatcardinals typically are russet. She uses this to form the observation that an unusual collection ofcardinals has gathered at the zoo, and hence to wonder: Why have only female cardinals gathered?A novice, on the other hand, without Sue's knowledge, would have no reason to inquire further.This sort of knowledge that an expert may have regarding cardinals is precisely what a rangedefault about cardinal color expresses, and this knowledge is crucial to the reasoning illustrated.Thus, not only is the formal representation of range defaults of interest in a purely theoretical sense(Can a formalism represent them?), it also has pragmatic ramications for commonsense reasoningformalisms.The representation and use of range defaults clearly hinges on the representation and use ofdenied defaults: defaults that not only are not part of one's belief base but are explicitly believedto be false. Denying a default requires explicit recognition of that default as a mistake to avoid.5In a sense we all become less \novice" and more \expert" about everyday matters concerning people,relationships, gender, etc. as we grow up. 7
This we suggest is abundant in an expert's repertoire and less so in a novice's.62.2 The problem of denying defaultsHow can we formally represent range defaults? From our previous discussion we need two things:rstly a plain disjunctive default principle 	 typ! _i2I i (1)and secondly assertions to the eect that the range cannot be restricted any further. That is, forevery non-empty proper subset J of I the associated potential default principle is denied ::(	 typ! _i2J i) (2)Thus (1) and (2) together formalize the total range default.Notice that (1) is doing double-duty.7 On the one hand it encodes a typicality statement aboutthe population of 	-things (i.e., a statement asserting a \population trend") and on the other itencodes a means of drawing a conclusion about a specic 	-thing. But then (2) is puzzling: Whichis being denied, the typicality statement or the inference procedure? If we take denial literallyand use classical negation|as indicated in (2)|then a problem surfaces immediately in DL wheredefaults are written as inference rules, since there is no recognized formal notion of the negationof a rule of inference. In NML and circumscription, negating a default results in a counterexampleaxiom, which simply records that the default has led to an error in at least one case and is not anassertion that the default itself is a bad one that should not be used. (We analyze these issues indetail in [9].)In short, default denial seems to create varied diculties for standard formalisms. We will utilizethe approach of [9] which appears to handle all of the problems simultaneously and uniformly acrossall the formalisms. We summarize this briey in Section 2.3 below and then apply it our sampleexpert-novice dialog, in Section 3.6We are unaware of any empirical studies bearing on this, however.7The reader may wish to view typ! in terms of a particular formalism, say DL, to see the dual functionsserved by (1). We will illustrate this below in Section 2.3.8
2.3 Formally separating the two default featuresDefaults tend to be formally represented in combined form containing a conation between ageneral typicality (or trend) about a population on the one hand, and a sanctioning of inferredconclusions about a particular member of the population on the other hand. The negation of sucha representation (when possible at all) then mixes together both the unsoundness of the inferences,and the denial of the population-trend, even if (as in the case of range defaults) only the latter iswanted.The key, then, is to view a default as having two complementary features. One is the typicalitystatement Typ giving default information as a trend about the commonsense world. The otheris the inferential mechanism Inf by means of which Typ is used to produce default conclusions.What is needed for default denial is negating Typ, not Inf . But when Inf and Typ are combinedin a single representation, this is problematic.Our approach is as follows: we treat standard default mechanisms as largely playing the role ofInf , and adjoin a separate typicality statement to play the role of Typ. Should we want to denythe trend itself we assert :Typ, the negation of the latter statement.As an example, in DL we rst replace each default rule of the form8	 :  (3)by the axiom Typically(	;) (4)and adjoin a single new inference ruleP ^ Typically(P;Q) : QQ (5)where P and Q are second-order variables that can be bound to rst-order expressions such as 	and . Then (4) and (5) together produce the eect of (3) by binding P to 	 and Q to 	. Foran individual a, if (it is believed that) 	(a), then (a) is concluded when consistent. On the otherhand, for a particular 	0 and 0, if 	0(a) and Typically(	0;0) is not believed then (5) does notproduce 0(a). Therefore it is the presence or absence of statements like (4) which control the use8We remind the reader that 	 : 	 has the approximate reading: If 	 is believed, and if  is consistentwith all that is believed, then  is inferred (believed).9
of (5). For a particular 	0 and 0, we can even explicitly deny such a population trend by asserting:Typically(	0;0) (6)To return to the issue of expertise, the above discussion lends itself to the idea that a singlegeneral-purpose default-use mechanism, as in (5), may suce for experts and novices alike.9 Wesuggest that default reasoning dierences between experts and novices may hinge on dierences inknowledge of the form (4) as well as denials (6); we pursue these ideas in Sections 3 and 4.3 Example revisited|pieces of a formal treatmentOnce typicality statements are separated from the inferential mechanism range defaults can beaccurately represented. We illustrate this by casting fragments of the knowledge evident in oursample dialog, into a more formal setting.At the start of the conversation, Tommy's and Sue's knowledge bases (KB) include:Fragment of Tommy's KB Fragment of Sue's KBTypically(Cardinal;Red) Typically(Cardinal;Red_ Russet)(8x) (Cardinal(x)! Bird(x) :Typically(Cardinal;Red)Typically(Bird;F ly) :Typically(Cardinal;Russet)(8x) Cardinal(x)! Bird(x)Typically(Bird; F ly)Typically(Cardinal^ Female; Russet)Typically(Cardinal^Male; Red)(8x) Cardinal(x)! Red(x) _Russet(x) _White(x)Notice that both Sue and Tommy hold a default about cardinal color, but Sue's is a rangedefault (contained in the rst three beliefs, above) whereas Tommy's is not. Additionally Sue holdssimple defaults concerning female cardinal color and male cardinal color and a rm (non-default)belief about all possible cardinal colors; Tommy does not.9We do not suggest that all reasoning mechanisms are necessarily shared by experts and novices, ratherwe speculate that a specialized default mechanism is.10
Using the above knowledge bases, the following conclusions are readily drawn (in DL, say)about an individual cardinal b0, given the additional fact Cardinal(b0). (Starred () conclusionsare default inferences.)Tommy's Initial Conclusions Sue's Initial ConclusionsRed(b0) Red(b0) _ Russet(b0)Bird(b0) Bird(b0)Fly(b0) Fly(b0)Red(b0) _Russet(b0) _White(b0)From the still further informationMale(b0), Sue would conclude Red(b0); and from Female(b0)she would conclude Russet(b0). Tommy would conclude nothing further if given either Male(b0)or Female(b0).At the end of the dialog, after Sue's instruction, Tommy's knowledge base still contains a singledefault about cardinal color, but now it is a range default:Fragment of Tommy's New KBTypically(Cardinal;Red_Russet):Typically(Cardinal; Red):Typically(Cardinal; Russet)(8x) Cardinal(x)! Bird(x)Typically(Bird;F ly)Tommy still lacks some of Sue's knowledge about cardinal color, namely Typically(Cardinal^Female; Russet) and Typically(Cardinal ^Male; Red), but his previously held (bad) default isnow gone. From Cardinal(b0) Tommy now can conclude Red(b0) _Russet(b0).11
4 A tentative formal characterization of expertiseWe can use our foregoing analysis and sample dialog to motivate a characterization of expertise interms of a default-reasoning framework. Recall:(1) Tommy: \Look, someone's feeding all those birds!"(2) Sue: \Do you know what kind of birds they are?"(3) Tommy: \No."(4) Sue: \They're cardinals."(5) Tommy: \But they're not red. I thought cardinals were supposed to be bright red."(6) Sue: \I used to think that also. Quite a few are red but many others are russet like these."(7) Tommy: \Are all cardinals red or russet?"(8) Sue: \Almost; a very few are white albinos. I wonder why only russet ones are here."(9) Sue (to the zookeeper): \Why are there only female cardinals here?"(10) Zookeeper: \We put the males in another cage for an experiment."Sue (the expert) enters the scenario with more defaults than Tommy (the novice), includinga range default about cardinal color. Her defaults are presumably well-grounded in breadth, i.e.,many observations (not only her own, but also of others who have taught her) have led her tobelieve them. She also has default denials; knows about exceptions to her (range) defaults, e.g.,albino cardinals; knows that the collection of female cardinals is unusual or abnormal; and knowswhen she does not know enough to explain the unusual collection of cardinals.We propose the following tentative formal characterization of expertise: Experts hold a substantial number of defaults (compared to a novice) in thedomain of expertise. Sue holds more, but related, defaults than does Tommy, even aftershe has given him some instruction, at which time Tommy still remains unaware that femalecardinals typically are russet, and males typically are red. Expert's defaults are well grounded in breadth. (See [11] for a discussion of breadthof knowledge and [4] for related issues.) Novices' defaults tend to be overly specic or overly general. Tommy's original12
default concerning cardinal color, that \cardinals typically are red" (indicated by line 5 ofthe dialog), is too narrow; Sue provides a more accurate range (red or russet) for his default(line 6). Experts also hold a substantial supply of default denials, each indicating a com-mon mistake to be avoided. Sue's statement \Quite a few are red but many others arerusset" (line 6) indicates that she also holds the default denial that \it is not the case thatcardinals are typically red" as well as the default denial that \it is not the case that cardinalsare typically russet". Experts have the ability to deal with individual exceptions to defaults. Sue knowsthat some exceptional cardinals are white (line 8). Experts know when collections of things are abnormal, based on combined de-faults and default denials. Sue wonders why only russet cardinals have gathered at thezoo (line 8)|an abnormal situation given her default (\cardinals are typically red or russet")together with her default denial (\it is not the case that cardinals are typically russet".) Experts know when they don't know, i.e., they know when it's time to ask forhelp. As Sue does in line 9.5 ConclusionWe have examined expertise from the point of view of default reasoning, and suggested a numberof connections. In particular, we noted the importance of the ability to deny a default principle,and illustrated a formal mechanism for this in the context of a dialog between an expert and anovice. While we do not claim that defaults (and denials) are all there is to expertise, we do thinkthat this is a fruitful dimension along which to explore expert reasoning, including novice-expertshifts.We did not give a formal treatment of the entire Tommy-Sue dialog. That would have involvedmany additional mechanisms beyond the scope of this paper, and indeed beyond the state of13
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